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Legally Speaking — Facing Up To Facebook
by Bill Hannay (Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, IL) <whannay@schiffhardin.com>

I

n August, a Florida appellate court made the
news when it rejected a claim that a judge
presiding over a dispute between a law firm
and its former client should be disqualified
because the judge is a Facebook “friend” with
a lawyer representing a potential witness and
potential party in the pending litigation. See
Herssein v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2017
Fla. App. LEXIS 12035 (3d Dist. 2017). The
appellate court didn’t think that being a Facebook “friend” meant much.
For librarians, this case may not seem very
relevant to their work or lives, and it probably
isn’t unless you happen to be a party to a lawsuit and try to “friend” the judge or vice versa.
That actually happened in another Florida case.
(Is there something in the water?)
A trial judge in Florida sent a “friend” request to a female litigant whose divorce case
was pending before him. On advice of counsel,
she decided not to respond to the invitation.
The judge thereafter ruled against the woman,
attributing most of the marital debt to her and
providing her ex-husband with a disproportionately excessive alimony award. The woman
moved to disqualify the judge in her case.
The judge himself heard her motion and not
surprisingly denied it as not “legally sufficient.”
To determine whether a motion to disqualify is “legally sufficient,” a court must decide
whether the alleged facts which, accepted
as true, would prompt a reasonably prudent
person to fear that she could not get a fair and
impartial trial before that judge. The appellate
court granted her motion, holding that:
It seems clear that a judge’s ex parte
communication with a party presents a
legally sufficient claim for disqualification, particularly in the case where the
party’s failure to respond to a Facebook
“friend” request creates a reasonable fear
of offending the solicitor. The “friend”
request placed the litigant between the
proverbial rock and
a hard place: either
engage in improper ex parte communications with
the judge presiding over the case
or risk offending
the judge by not
accepting the
“friend” request.

The case is Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802
(Fla. Ct. of App., 5th Dist., 2014).
So, if you stay out of court, are librarians
free from worrying about the legality of Facebook “friending?” Not necessarily. Librarians
may be drawn into ethical disputes if they are
asked to help do research that involves Facebook or other social media. For example, two
New Jersey lawyers have been the target of
ethics charges for attempting to gain improper
access to Facebook information. Robertelli v.
New Jersey Office of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J.
470, 134 A.3d 963 (2016).
The N.J. Office of Attorney Ethics began an
investigation of the lawyers representing the
defendants in a personal injury case against a
municipality, its police department, and a policeman who was involved in the accident. In
order to obtain information about the plaintiff
(named Hernandez), the defense attorneys
directed a paralegal employed by their firm
to search the Internet. Among other sources,
she accessed Hernandez’s Facebook page.
Initially, the page was open to the public. At a
later point, the privacy settings on the account
were changed to limit access only to Facebook
users who were Hernandez’s “friends.” The
ethics office claimed that the defense attorneys
directed the paralegal to access and continue to
monitor the non-public pages of Hernandez’s
Facebook account. She therefore submitted
a “friend request” to Hernandez, without
revealing that she worked for the law firm
representing defendants or that she was investigating him in connection with the lawsuit.
Hernandez accepted the friend request, and the
paralegal was able to obtain information from
the non-public pages of his Facebook account.
When the plaintiff learned of these facts, he
objected to use of the information in the trial
and filed a grievance with the ethics office.
The local bar committee refused to docket
the grievance on the ground that the allegations,
if proven, would not constitute
unethical conduct. A state
trial court affirmed that decision. The state ethics office
disagreed and appealed to
the New Jersey Supreme
Court (the ultimate authority on ethical matters in the
state). The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and
ordered that the ethics office
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“may … proceed to prosecute the alleged misconduct in this case.” The high court stated:
This matter presents a novel ethical
issue: whether an attorney can direct
someone to “friend” an adverse, represented party on Facebook and gather
information about the person that is not
otherwise available to the public. No
reported case law in our State addresses
the question. Consistent with the goals
of the disciplinary process, the court
rules do not close off further inquiry if
a DEC Secretary declines to docket an
important, novel issue as to which there
is little guidance, or mistakenly declines
to docket an allegation of egregious,
unethical conduct. The Director of the
OAE, by virtue of the broader scope of
his position, sees the breadth of issues
raised throughout the State and is aware
of national trends. The public is best
served by a system that permits both
volunteers in the DECs and professionals
in the OAE to assess challenging ethical
matters like the one presented in this case.
A similar misuse of Facebook “friending”
resulted in a determination by the San Diego
County Bar Association in 2011 that an attorney had violated his ethical duty not to deceive.
The attorney represented a client in a wrongful
discharge action and obtained from his client a
list of former co-workers. The attorney sent a
Facebook “friend” request to two high-ranking
company employees whom the client believed
were not happy with their employer and were
likely to make disparaging remarks about
the employer on their Facebook pages. The
“friend” request only included the attorney’s
name and did not disclose his representation
of the complaining employee or the purpose
of the “friending.”
If a librarian is asked to help someone
obtain information on Facebook about a third
party, it is wise to keep in mind that Facebook
users have privacy rights (and privacy settings
on Facebook). It is unwise and perhaps even
illegal for a librarian to assist someone to
evade or penetrate those privacy settings by
“friending” in bad faith.
And if that’s not enough of a problem, some
states have entered the fight over Facebook
“friends” by passing laws making it illegal
for state teachers to “friend” their students
continued on page 48
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Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
Column Editor: Laura N. Gasaway (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School
of Law, Chapel Hill, NC 27599; Phone: 919-962-2295; Fax: 919-962-1193) <laura_gasaway@unc.edu>
www.unc.edu/~unclng/gasaway.htm
QUESTION: A college librarian asks
about possible copyright violations when using lecture capture and that lecture includes
copyrighted materials.
ANSWER: The first important follow
up question deals with how is the lecture
captured. Podcast with sound only? Or is it
filmed? Further, much of the answer depends
on what the college does with the lectures
at that point. Are they posted on the web?
Available over Youtube? Posted in a course
management system available only to members of the class?
If the lecture capture is sound only, there
is unlikely to be a problem at all. Section
110(1) of the Copyright Act if 1976 permits
the performance of nondramatic literary and
musical works in a classroom in a nonprofit
educational institution as a part of instruction. Therefore, capturing the reading of a
poem, an essay, etc., or singing of a song is
not problematic. Where the lecture is then
stored and who may access may be a problem;
that will be discussed below. It the lecture is
videorecorded, then graphic works and photographs may be captured, and section 110(1)
permits that. Note that audiovisual works are
not included. Section 110(1) does not permit
the performance of entire audiovisual works
without permission of the copyright owner
even in the course of instruction. But small
portions of such works included in a lecture
capture are likely fair use.
Placing captured lectures on the web so
that anyone may access them is not a good
idea. Putting them in a course management
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on Facebook. In 2011, Governor Jay Nixon
signed Missouri State Bill 54, which bans students and teachers from communicating and
being “friends” on the social networking site.
(The law is intended to prevent inappropriate
relationships between children and teachers.)
So if you are a librarian in a state school, you
should check out your state’s laws before
“friending” a student … for any reason.

Bill Hannay is a partner at the Chicago-based law firm, Schiff Hardin LLP, a
regular speaker at the Charleston Conference, and a frequent contributor to Against
the Grain. In his spare time, he is an Adjunct
Professor of Law at IIT/Chicago-Kent law
school and a playwright.

system with access restricted to students
enrolled in the course causes no copyright
problems even if the lecture includes portions of copyrighted audiovisual
works. Section 110(2) of the
Act allows transmission of
performances or displays
of nondramatic literary
or musical works and
portions of audiovisual
works without permission of the copyright
owner if access is
restricted to students enrolled in
the course. Transmitting a captured
lecture that contains an entire audiovisual
work and making it available even to enrolled
students requires permission of the copyright
owner.
QUESTION: A university librarian asks
about works created through artificial intelligence (AI) and who owns the copyright in
such works.
ANSWER: Copyright experts debated
this issue for years before there were actual
creative works produced by a computer. Today, there are many types of computer-generated works including poetry, paintings,
software and music, etc. According to news
reports, Google has even created sounds that
no human has heard before. The courts in
the United States have always held that only
works of human authorship may receive a
copyright. Consider the reason that copyright
exists in this country, to enable owners to reap
the economic benefit from their works that, in
turn, will encourage them to continue to produce copyrighted works, which thus benefits
the public. Would awarding a copyright to
a computer encourage it to create additional
works? No.
This is similar to the way courts have dealt
with whether animals can own copyright. The
answer has also been no, because only human
authors can make the decisions about whether
to grant licenses for the use of their works, etc.
With AI created works increasing, it may
be that Congress and the courts will have to
revisit this issue in the future. As we learn
more about animal intelligence and creativity
perhaps, the human authorship requirement
should also be reconsidered for works by
animals.
QUESTION: A library director asks what
has happened with the suit Louisiana State
University (LSU) filed against Elsevier over
a contract dispute about whether the LSU
School of Veterinary Medicine was included
in the overall university contract for access
to Elsevier’s journals.
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ANSWER: The short answer is that the
case has settled. The suit was filed in May
2017 in Louisiana state court. (Contract disputes typically are matters governed
by state law and decided
in state courts.) The vet
school had separately
subscribed to Elsevier content but decided that the contract
would not be renewed
when it expired in
2016 because the
university’s contract covered its
35,000 students,
staff and faculty,
and the vet school is a part of the university.
In October, Elsevier cut off vet school access;
LSU wrote to Elsevier and had that access
reactivated. The vet school asked to add
some medical and veterinary titles to LSU’s
2017 subscription. Elsevier quoted a price
and LSU confirmed its acceptance of these
terms. Nevertheless, in January 2017, access
was again terminated.
According to LSU, Elsevier then refused
to honor the agreement or to license any of the
agreed upon titles to LSU. So, the question before the court was whether there was a valid offer and acceptance. By letter in April, Elsevier
suggested that LSU add the desired veterinary
medicine titles to its existing contract and pay
an additional $170,000 in subscription costs
plus $30,000 as a cost increase to the overall
contract. LSU’s existing contract with Elsevier is about $1.5 million annually.
Elsevier says that the dispute arose because
LSU, without paying for it, was asking the
publisher to add a school that previously was
separate. The LSU contract did not include
the vet school, further, neither was there any
merger of the university and the school for the
contract negotiated.
An interesting issue the case raised was
jurisdiction. Elsevier is a Dutch company and
its contracts usually require that litigation take
place in the Netherlands. This is common for
corporations whether foreign or domestic. U.S.
companies typically would specify the state in
which the company headquarters is located as
the jurisdiction for lawsuits. A problem for
state supported colleges and universities is that
they are often required by state statute to sign
contracts only if the contracts specify that state
as the jurisdiction for any disputes to be settled.
QUESTION: A publishing librarian
asks whether the exceptions for nonprofit
educational uses in a classroom and for
distance education also apply to nonprofit
educational publishers.
continued on page 49
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